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“Stormy Weather” is dedicated to the memory of Francis Barker (1952-1999), 
close friend and colleague.  I would have enjoyed our arguments about it. 
 
1. This essay was written and submitted to Early Modern Culture before Alan 
Sinfield’s “Selective Quotation” appeared, with the reponse by David Siar, 
and the response to them both by Richard Levin, so the similarity of topic is 
a coincidence; but a nice one inasmuch as Sinfield and Levin both feature 
here, though not centrally.
1
  Although written separately, and focussing 
exclusively on The Tempest, “Stormy Weather” now appears as the fourth 
contribution to a debate about quotation, paraphrase, and misreading.
2
  The 
final paragraphs relate my essay to this larger debate. 
* 
2. One Friday morning, late in 1983, Francis Barker and I had travelled down 
to London to take part in one of a series of meetings that Methuen had 
organised for discussion of the Alternative Shakespeares volume which 
John Drakakis was editing, and to which we were contributing an essay on 
The Tempest, which I’ll refer to here simply as “Nymphs and Reapers” 
(Barker and Hulme 1985).  Over coffee before the meeting started, Kate 
Belsey was muttering to herself about a book called Reconstructing 
Literature, reviewed that day in The Times Literary Supplement, which 
contained an essay by John Holloway (1983) deeply critical of her 1980 
book Critical Practice.  She had some sympathy, she said, for Holloway’s 
criticism of her maladroit prose.  At lunchtime, in order to quell a nagging 
suspicion, she looked up several of Holloway’s quotations from Critical 
Practice.  They weren’t in the book.  What had apparently happened was 
that Holloway had taken extensive notes, and had then written his essay 
from the notes without reference back to Belsey’s book.  An easy mistake to 
make, after all; and one for which we would nowadays give our students a 
zero and allow them to write another essay.  Unfortunately, it’s not quite so 
easy to give published essays a second chance; but then nobody, in any 
case, took much notice of Reconstructing Literature.
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3. This anecdote has always remained inseparable from “Nymphs and reapers” 
for me.  It offers a rather frightening limit case of what we all now ‘know’ 
as one of the accepted truths about language but find difficult to come to 
terms with: that, once published, once in the public domain, words are open 
to all kinds of (mis)interpretations over which we have very little control.  
What happened to Critical Practice in Holloway’s essay was a misreading 
in one of the clearest possible senses of the word: no defence was offered 
because none could be adequate.  To point out that ham-fisted paraphrase 
had been offered as quotation was enough to remove all credibility from the 
essay.  Would that it were always so easy.  Quotations are not usually 
fictitious, just out of context or cobbled together from different paragraphs; 
paraphrases of our words are often – for us – tendentious, often miss the 
nub of our meaning.  If we had wanted to use so few words to convey the 
complexity of our thought, we would have done so; but we needed them all.  
It’s something of a paradox that literary criticism should have gained 
enormously in the sophistication of its readings over the last 25 years, and 
yet at the same time writers such as Derrida should spend so much time 
quoting their own words in order to try to demonstrate that they were not 
saying what they have been read as saying.  Given the enormously increased 
volume of critical writing, the assistance which we can now get through 
online searches, and the fashion for comprehensive reviews of everything 
ever written on a particular subject, we are all now more likely than ever to 
find academic summaries of our own words boomeranging back to us.  At 
the end of his piece Alan Sinfield adopts a slightly world-weary tone about 
all this: “If Shakespeare has to put up with it, why should lesser mortals 
complain?” – although he has of course just written his piece precisely in 
order to complain.  I wrote this essay because I think we need to complain, 
not just to put the record straight, but also to further intellectual 
conversations which are worth having. 
4. The Greenblatts and Bhabhas of the academic world have probably had 
little option but to develop a thick skin: in any case they could hardly keep 
up with tendentious accounts of their work.  Those of us who have only 
ever written a couple of pieces which anybody seems to have read no doubt 
find it easier to check on how we are quoted and summarised.  Fifteen years 
on, “Nymphs and Reapers” (along with the associated chapter, “Prospero 
and Caliban”, from my 1986 book Colonial Encounters, and the earlier 
essay, “Hurricanes in the Caribbees” (1981)) have been quite frequently 
cited in the extraordinary explosion of writing about The Tempest, usually 
read as exemplary of the ‘New Historicist’ or ‘Cultural Materialist’ or 
‘revisionist’ or ‘political’ or ‘colonialist’ or ‘postcolonial’ approaches to the 
play.  This essay takes the opportunity to read the readings and to try to 
reflect on some of the issues that they raise.  Constantly to complain about 
misleading paraphrases and quotations out of context would be tedious.  I 
look at some examples here only because this whole question relates 
intimately to the reading of The Tempest itself. 
* 
5. A couple of months after Alternative Shakespeares had appeared, Howard 
Felperin came to Essex to give a departmental seminar.  He began by 
announcing that he was going to talk about New Historicism, and that Essex 
was an appropriate place for such a talk since the Literature department was 
home to two New Historicists, Francis and myself.  We looked at each other 
in some puzzlement since neither of us had heard this strange phrase before.  
Felperin’s labelling was at the time a mystifying but in no sense hostile or 
mischievous categorisation.  
6. The question of categorisation, always problematic, is clearly unavoidable if 
a wide range of material is being discussed in a restricted compass.  One has 
to recognise that some distance is necessary in order to make any groupings 
feasible; and at the same time recognise that such groupings have an 
inevitable degree of mystification and arbitrariness about them.  The 
problem usually comes when the label is read instead of analysing the 
contents of the bottle.  I’m not going to spend time contesting the current 
labels.  Felperin’s own writings (1990a, 1990b) distinguished between New 
Historicism as a U.S. phenomenon and Cultural Materialism as its British 
equivalent – but with differences.  There are proper histories to be written of 
both, but it should at least be understood that Cultural Materialism is a 
programme launched with the volume Political Shakespeare, including a 
manifesto written by the editors, and an afterword by the perceived 
progenitor of the cultural materialist approach, Raymond Williams.
4
  From 
across the Atlantic, the positions of Hawkes-Belsey, Sinfield-Dollimore, or 
Drakakis-Holderness – to coin some double-barrelled critics to set alongside 
the Barker-Hulme invented by Edward Pechter (1991: 83) – might seem 
broadly similar: they’ve all clearly read too much post-structuralist theory, 
and bring politics into everything.  At home the differences within and 
between all those doubles can often seem more important than the common 
ground they share, especially when they’re sitting across the table from each 
other.
5
  Where that matters for my purposes is that critics often read what 
they expect to see argued rather than what the words on the page actually 
say, and I assume that they do this because having labelled, say, Drakakis as 
a Cultural Materialist, and having read a cogent defence of a particular 
position put forward by, say, Sinfield, arch-Cultural Materialist, they 
conclude that Drakakis qua Cultural Materialist must hold Sinfield’s 
position – and proceed to discover it in his words.  Richard Levin actually 
offers a text-book case of this misreading when he quotes phrases such as 
“actual diversity” and “in fact the key to the play” as examples of what he 
calls “Leaking Relativism”,6 while merely assuming – but failing to find 
evidence – of an actual relativism from which these remarks are supposed to 
‘leak’. 
7. I have to risk my own simplifications in categorising recent readings of The 
Tempest.  For my purposes here, the distinctions between New Historicism 
and Cultural Materialism – however those terms are used – are not 
significant; and neither is the related question of differences between U.S. 
and British approaches.  Anachronistically, I’ll use the term “postcolonial” 
as a shorthand to refer to readings that have emphasised the importance of 
colonial questions to The Tempest.  (In the 1980s these readings were 
sometimes simply called “revisionist” (Skura 1989: 43)).  
8. There would obviously be many different ways of categorising the 
responses to postcolonial readings of The Tempest.  What strikes me as 
significant are two tendencies (which sometimes overlap).  The first sees the 
introduction of colonial questions as constituting part of an unwanted 
politicisation of Shakespeare.  Despite the implications of “Shakespeare 
Left and Right”, the misleading title given to a series of papers growing out 
of a session on Shakespeare and ideology at the MLA in 1989, the 
arguments here are not in any simple sense between ‘left’ and ‘right’ 
(Kamps 1991).  With the single exception of George Will’s outburst (1991), 
those who have objected to the ‘politicisation’ of Shakespeare have been 
situated – where their politics have been offered or obvious – on the left, 
either liberal or socialist (not allowing here for U.S. / British differences).  
Let me make it clear that I am keen to concede this ground.  There may be 
connections to be made between, on the one hand, ‘radical’ theory and 
‘radical’ (left) politics, and on the other ‘traditional’ approaches to the 
literary text and conservative (right) politics – though my punctuation no 
doubt suggests some uncertainty with respect to these shorthand terms.  
However, those putative links don’t interest me here.  I’m happy to concede 
that the traditional defences of Shakespeare, and the more nuanced critiques 
of postcolonial readings which I’ll address below, are situated in some 
general sense ‘on the left’.  I concede this because I want the discussion to 
take place on the grounds of reading and scholarship chosen by those who 
have opposed the postcolonial approach to The Tempest: this is a tactical 
raid rather than the usual elaborate building of defences around one of two 
entrenched positions.
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9. In Britain there is certainly a long tradition of left opposition to ‘Theory’ 
(which seems to run alongside a predisposition towards reifying what it 
opposes through use of the upper case).  E.P. Thompson’s attack on 
Althusser and his influence is obviously the standard reference point, but 
Nicholas Tredell (against Belsey in PN Review and elsewhere), James Wood 
(against Terence Hawkes in the London Review of Books and The Guardian 
[ad nauseam]), and John MacKenzie (against CDT – Colonial Discourse 
Theory) on Edward Said belong to this tradition.
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10. Brian Vickers’ Appropriating Shakespeare (1993) joins this trend by 
defending the playwright against what he calls “Current Literary Theory” 
(CLT).  Vickers constructs CLT, a mite simplistically, as basically 
structuralist and post-structuralist, which allows him to attack Saussure, 
Derrida, and Foucault, often through invoking the criticisms made of these 
theorists by the like of, say, Perry Anderson and Peter Dews, and openly 
aligning himself at the end of his book with Edward Said (1993: 439). He 
can therefore present himself as (roughly) a left humanist opposed to the 
pseudo-science of theoretical Marxism (Althusser and Macherey) and of 
linguistico-psychoanalytic mumbo jumbo (Derrida and Lacan and their 
weak-kneed English acolytes).  The last pages of this very long book are 
targetted at “Nymphs and Reapers” and also offer a brief defence of the 
traditional reading of The Tempest. 
11. Appropriating Shakespeare is an indicative title for those who see recent 
revisionary approaches to Shakespeare’s work as involving an unacceptable 
politicisation of the literary realm.  Not even ‘misappropriation’, because 
that would presumably leave open the possibility that Shakespeare could be 
‘correctly’ appropriated: the implication has to be that Shakespeare simply 
is and should properly be left to be.  As readers and audiences and critics we 
either submit ourselves to the plays or we are guilty of bringing our own 
contemporary interests to bear, thereby ‘appropriating’ the plays, taking 
them from their ‘proper’ place.  Their ‘proper’ place is the period in which 
they were written, and Vickers can quite properly call his argument 
‘historicist’, in one of the meanings of that multivalent word.9   
12. Vickers’ reading of The Tempest attempts to be historicist in the sense of 
restoring what he sees as the proper set of historical meanings to the play 
(what Shakespeare thought he was saying, the language and categories that 
he had access to) rather than the supposedly imposed meanings foisted onto 
the play by CLT: “Attacks on the dominant ideology... use the plays for 
modern political purposes, and distort them in order to fulfil their own 
ideological agenda” (415).  So when Vickers defends Kermode’s 
introduction to the Arden edition by asserting that “the dichotomy of art and 
nature was important in Renaissance thought and in Shakespeare” (416), 
this is offered as the statement of a simple truth rather than as a politicised 
interpretation which divests the play of its evident engagement within 
contemporary ideological discourses.
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13. According to Vickers, postcolonial readings of The Tempest are guilty of 
reducing the play to “an allegory about colonialism” with Prospero seen as 
“an exploitative protocapitalist” and Caliban “an innocent savage, deprived 
of his legitimate heritage” (242).  The postcolonial revisionists have leftish 
pretensions and therefore tend to see capitalists or protocapitalists in any 
figure that wields authority, and they are incurably romantic about the Third 
World and will therefore sentimentalize all natives.  The reading of 
literature has become, for these critics, according to Vickers, a kind of 
show-trial in which works of literature, amongst them The Tempest, are 
judged in the balance and found guilty of endorsing colonialism and its 
evils. 
14. Vickers tackles the postcolonial readings of The Tempest by offering his 
own version of the traditional reading through the suggestion that the play is 
offering an implied critique of the humanist equation of ratio and oratio by 
its invention of a character, Caliban, who is anomalous within the Great 
Chain of Being, capable of language but incapable of reason, above the 
animals but below humanity, a “curious mixture, part-human, part-animal” 
(244).  This is a curious description which Vickers ‘supports’ from the text: 
“Caliban was the child that Sycorax ‘did litter here, / A freckled whelp hag-
born -- not honour’d with / A human shape’ (1.2.283ff)” (244).  This won’t 
be the last we see of these lines.  On one level Vickers’ quotation illustrates 
the simple point that even somebody openly eschewing ‘appropriations’ of 
the play is perfectly capable of constructing his own meaning by 
misquotation: the full sentence makes it clear that Prospero was, reluctantly 
perhaps, including Caliban in the category of those “honour’d with a human 
shape”: 
Then was this island -- 
Save for the son that she did litter here, 
A freckled whelp, hag-born -- not honoured with 
A human shape.  (1.2.281-4)
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15. However, on another level, the words introducing the misquotation are of 
more significance than the misquotation itself.  “Caliban was”, followed by 
Prospero’s words, indicates Vickers’ assent to precisely the kind of 
unthinking equation of Prospero’s view with the playwright’s that “Nymphs 
and Reapers” was trying to contest.  The irony here is that Vickers, trapped 
in the self-reflecting mirrors of that equation, must accept what he is told 
(could he but read the lines correctly).  Were he not blinded by the visor he 
wears as self-appointed protector of Shakespeare’s plays from the muddled-
headed neo-Althusserian Cultural Materialists, he might take the points that 
Prospero’s views about Caliban and his origins are not necessarily 
authoritative, that the interchanges with Ariel and Caliban need to be read in 
context and with careful attention to the development of Prospero’s 
character, and that the evidence of what happened before the play started 
comes from more than one source and therefore needs considered 
assessment.  These kinds of arguments – there in “Nymphs and Reapers” 
and “Prospero and Caliban” – would have opened up a space in which his 
reading of Caliban, not a reading with which I would agree, but nonetheless 
a tenable reading, could have contributed to the intricate discussion of that 
character which has flourished over the last twenty years.  But, given 
Vickers’ assumptions, if Prospero calls Caliban human, then human he must 
be; and any suggestion otherwise, such as the one that Vickers makes, must 
be a dreaded ‘appropriation’ and therefore anathema. 
16. At least Vickers is offering some kind of engagement with the arguments he 
wants to counter.  Jonathan Bate has offered a series of off-hand remarks 
about postcolonial readings of The Tempest.  In his Shakespeare and Ovid 
(1993) he refers to Greenblatt’s “Learning to Curse”, briefly discusses the 
American materials in the play, and notes that the fact that Shakespeare read 
Montaigne’s essay “Of the Caniballes” is “the most compelling piece of 
evidence in support of the view that the play is a troubled exploration of 
imperial and colonial strategies”; only to conclude that “Montaigne and 
Shakespeare have thus come to the assistance of post-colonial critics who 
for good reasons need to work through their own guilt about these matters” 
(243).  No references, no trial, just announced guilt.  One wonders how this 
remark might apply to the postcolonial reading offered by, say, Abena 
Busia, who begins her discussion of the play by saying that she wishes “to 
write my female African black self back into the text” (1989-90: 82).  Not 
much postcolonial guilt on show there. 
17. Two years later, Bate repeats the substance of his point, but in even stronger 
terms: “Fashionable criticism is interested in assuaging the guilt of empire 
by making the author of The Tempest a scapegoat” (1995: 155).  No 
argument or support is offered for this unusual claim, which I suppose must 
pass as a psychoanalytical interpretation of postcolonial critics; and Bate 
moves quickly on to brandish his recent discovery of the “remarkable 
creative work” done around The Tempest in the 1950s and 1960s by the 
“self-proclaimed Calibans” – Caribbean writers such as George Lamming, 
Edward Kamau Brathwaite, Aimé Césaire, and Roberto Fernández Retamar.  
Bate freely admits to his own “shame” at not knowing about this work 
earlier (what is this obsession with guilt and shame all about?), but assuages 
such feelings by pointing out that his ignorance has been shared by 
revisionist writers such as Stephen Greenblatt, Stephen Orgel, and Eric 
Cheyfitz (155).  Only “a handful of articles by less well-known critics” 
(156) had begun to break this silence before Bate took up the torch.  Ouch!  
That’s definitely a classy move: if you haven’t read the relevant scholarship, 
call the critics who wrote it “less well-known” and make sure not to 
reference them in order to avoid the danger of them becoming better 
known.
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18. Bate’s best-selling The Genius of Shakespeare (1997) proved to be really 
“fashionable criticism”.  Fortunately Bate did not transfer that damning term 
to his book along with the several paragraphs he borrowed from his 1995 
essay, but the notion of guilt still has a prominent place: it becomes “the 
task of literary theory... to assuage the guilt of empire by making the author 
of The Tempest a scapegoat” (241).  In addition he has “the new critical 
radicalism” claiming that the traditional readings of The Tempest as 
Shakespeare’s “summation of his art and his reflections on art” are simply 
an illusion.  Instead: “the ugly truth which late twentieth-century criticism 
could exclusively reveal was that the play is in fact a text reeking of the 
discourse of colonialism. The Tempest must bear the blame for the Atlantic 
slave trade” (240).  The reading of the play “in these terms” began with 
Greenblatt’s “Learning to Curse” (1976), so he must bear the main brunt of 
this astounding statement (which even Dinesh D’Souza might judge a trifle 
over the top), although all the postcolonial readings are implicitly tarred 
with same brush. 
19. But then a strange thing happens.  Bate picks up his brief remarks about 
Lamming, Césaire, and Fernández Retamar from his 1995 essay and 
expands them in his chapter on The Tempest, so that readers approach the 
play via his discussion of postcolonial readings and rewritings, all here dealt 
with sympathetically.
13
  One of the things these writers were doing, Bate 
says, by way of introduction, was “reacting against a long critical orthodoxy 
which failed to appreciate the critique of Prospero that is built into the play” 
(241) – an interesting move on Bate’s part, which grants one of the major 
planks of the postcolonial reading.  And indeed, when he comes to his own 
exposition of the play, Bate talks about “Prospero’s version” of events, 
implicitly accepting that there are other stories and that Shakespeare’s 
version might not be identical to Prospero’s (244). 
20. Not unexpectedly this turns out to be a containing move – in two senses of 
that word.  The genius of Bate’s Shakespeare lies in the capaciousness of 
his work, which evolves and mutates in order to cope with changing cultural 
environments (316).  Having had a dominant “Prosperian” reading of the 
play for many years, the 1950s saw the ‘liberation’ of “the ‘Calibanesque’ 
reading that has always been latent in the play” (248).  So, “Perhaps the 
most astonishing thing about Shakespeare’s achievement is that it contained 
enough for him to become not just an icon of various European nationhoods 
but a voice of what we now call multiculturalism” (248).  In classically 
liberal fashion, Bate wants to have the best of both worlds – to give weight 
to the powerful readings and rewritings offered of The Tempest, and yet at 
the same time to argue that all these readings have somehow been locked up 
in the play waiting for Frantz Fanon to come along and liberate them.  The 
juggling of linguistic registers suggests unease on Bate’s part, although the 
philosophical difficulties about the relationship between a text and its 
readings are real enough, and his general approach to them perfectly 
reasonable within its own terms.  My disagreement is that such an approach 
‘contains’ the revisionary nature of the the Caribbean work he’s discussing 
by refusing to allow it to critique earlier readings of the play.  Instead, by 
calling the revisionary readings “Calibanesque”, he suggests they are 
equally as partial and limited as the earlier “Prosperian” readings.  The latter 
certainly lose their previously authoritative status, but they survive to 
become witnesses to Shakespearean capaciousness, partners in some 
enforced and unconvincing version of multicultural harmony. 
* 
21. A popular tactic in anti-postcolonial critique is to try to construct a third 
position, above or beyond the conflict.  There are two versions of this move: 
the political version in which ‘left’ and ‘right’ are seen as mirror images of 
each other; and the literary version in which the postcolonial revisionists are 
seen as having added something important to readings of the play – but 
overstated their case.  The first version is almost by definition apolitical, or 
coy about its politics.  Edward Pechter (discussed here) and Howard 
Felperin (not), the key figures here, represent the ‘humanist’ and 
‘deconstructive’ wings of this tendency.  The most important reference 
point for the literary version of the argument is Meredith Skura’s essay, 
discussed below. 
22. Pechter’s argument – directed against the concept of ideology – is that the 
supposed differences between ‘right’ (here Richard Levin) and ‘left’ (the 
usual suspects) mask similar self-contradictions: on the right the 
unattainable desire for transcendence of ideology, on the left the 
unattainable desire for the critique of ideology (“which turns out to be much 
the same thing” (1991: 83)).  (Bate has a version of this argument where the 
“New Iconoclasts” confront the “Anti-PC Vigilantes”, both groups “playing 
into each other’ hands” and both foundering on the rock of “Shakespeare’s 
cross-cultural appeal” (1997: 318)). 
23. Pechter begins his discussion of “Nymphs and Reapers” by noting 
(correctly) that we install struggle as a desideratum without explanation.  He 
goes on (and I need to quote at length): 
Perhaps, though, they provide an implicit answer in the main 
argument they make about alternative criticism, that it shouldn’t 
invest too heavily in original meaning.  The trouble with original 
meaning, they tell us, is that it’s irretrievable with any certainty.  
As a consequence, any argument about it is likely to be “wholly 
dissolved into an indeterminate miscellany [and] the only option 
becomes the voluntaristic ascription to the text of meanings and 
articulations derived simply from one’s own ideological 
preferences... a procedure only too vulnerable to pluralistic 
incorporation, a recipe for peaceful coexistence with the dominant 
readings, not for a contestation” (83, quoting “Nymphs and 
Reapers”, 193). 
 
24. The second part of “Nymphs and Reapers”, from which Pechter is here 
quoting, contrasts the traditional approach to the autotelic text with an 
“alternative criticism” which has paid particular attention to the successive 
inscriptions of a text during the course of its history.  Our view of this 
‘alternative’ development is nuanced.  We stress that it has produced 
important work, in particular demonstrating that texts can never be simply 
encountered “but are, on the contrary, repeatedly constructed under definite 
conditions” (192).  On the other hand, in the course of a brief discussion of 
Tony Bennett’s work, we express some reservations about the danger of 
dissolving the text into “an indeterminate miscellany of inscriptions” (193) 
because such a dissolution would remove the grounds for contestation: 
‘alternative’ readings would become merely additional or supplementary 
because they would have removed from themselves the claim to contest 
readings of the ‘same’ text.  This is very far from being the last word on the 
question of ‘the text in itself’, nor does it present itself as being so.14  
However, it is very obviously concerned to question the too rapid 
identification of the ‘radical’ reading with a lack of interest in the 
originating moment of production.  Our reading, historical in approach (if 
not historicist), certainly wants to locate The Tempest with respect to its 
moment of production, even if that locating will look different, through its 
emphasis on the imperial project, and will have implications for a reading of 
the play, some of which we are concerned to pursue. 
25. Paraphrase is a powerful weapon in argument.  “The trouble with original 
meaning, they tell us, is that it’s irretrievable with any certainty” is 
Pechter’s paraphrase.  Neither of those phrases, “the trouble with original 
meaning” nor “irretrievable with any certainty” appears in “Nymphs and 
Reapers”, and nor does any statement that could possibly be construed as 
having such an import.  Then, rather like Vickers’ misquotation from The 
Tempest, Pechter further misrepresents the argument of “Nymphs and 
Reapers” by quoting the second part of a sentence for which he provides his 
own subject.  According to Pechter, we say that any argument about original 
meaning is likely to be wholly dissolved into an indeterminate miscellany.  
In fact, the relevant sentence in “Nymphs and Reapers” reads: 
For if, as the logic of Bennett’s argument implies, ‘the text’ were 
wholly dissolved into an indeterminate miscellany of inscriptions, 
then how could any confrontation between different but 
contemporaneous inscriptions take place: what would be the 
ground of such a contestation? (193) 
 
26. Pechter clearly associates ‘left’ criticism with a dismissal of the problem of 
original meaning.  We are discussing the questions around the moment of 
textual production and subsequent inscriptions, and we are located on the 
left, therefore we must be saying that original meaning is irretrievable.  The 
problem that we don’t say any such thing can be rectified by paraphrase 
which comes close to complete invention, and doctored quotation which 
totally misrepresents the original meaning.
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  I use that last phrase to 
emphasise the dimensions of this discussion.  Unlike some others on the 
left, I do think that ‘meaning’ needs to be argued over, as long as it is clear 
that ‘meaning’ is not reducible to ‘intention’.  The lines quoted earlier from 
The Tempest and the paragraph quoted from “Nymphs and Reapers” mean 
through the conventions of the language, not because their respective 
authors intended to say something or other.  Let me emphasise again the 
restricted nature of this argument.  The ability to read what is on the page is 
fundamental to all forms of criticism.  The postcolonial readings of The 
Tempest are not better just because they tend to be more interesting (though 
they do – but that opinion may be subjective); they are also better because, 
as “Nymphs and Reapers” argues, they both read the play better, and read 
the misreadings of others.  ‘Reading’ is the ground on which the 
traditionalists stand: all you really need to be able to do is to read 
Shakespeare.  This argument is usually severely weakened by the 
impoverished notion of reading which underpins it, but it is devastated 
when its supporters demonstrate that they can’t read even in the least 
complex sense of that word. 
* 
27. Most critiques of Tempest revisionism claim to be conciliatory.  Yes, they 
say, there’s something in all this colonial stuff (even though it’s hardly 
new), and Prospero is perhaps to be looked at more sceptically (though 
some traditionalists said that too), and there’s nothing wrong with 
introducing some political and contextual dimensions to the play (as long as 
we remember to read the verse).  But, they continue, it’s much too one-sided 
as a reading.  So we’ll let it in as one dimension of the play; and, after all, 
the more dimensions each play has, the greater Shakespeare appears.  Bate 
offers one, albeit idiosyncratic, version of this critique.  I’ll now look more 
closely at two other versions, both broadly positive in tone, both 
appreciative of the insights of the postcolonial readings, if ultimately critical 
of some of their implications. 
28. William Hamlin’s “Men of Inde: Renaissance Ethnography and The 
Tempest” (1994) offers a reasonable summary of recent work on The 
Tempest which attempts “to locate the play explicitly within the complicated 
network of ideas, preconceptions, goals, schemes, rhetoric, and propaganda 
that constitutes colonial discourse” (17), and praises the “valuable 
contributions” this criticism has made to an understanding of the play’s 
dramatic construction (18).  However, there are the usual complaints about 
“moral and sociopolitical agendas” which “predetermine their conclusions” 
(20) – though no evidence of these sins is actually offered or discussed; and 
about “the near-dogmatism that seems endemic to colonialist readings” (21).  
This latter point is supported by reference to “Nymphs and Reapers”: 
‘The ensemble of fictional and lived practices, which for 
convenience we will simply refer to here as “English colonialism”, 
provides The Tempest’s dominant discursive con-texts’...  Rather 
than positing colonialism as a useful and illuminating discursive 
framework for the play, critics in this vein imply that The Tempest 
remains in many important respects unintelligible without the 
particular historical imbrication which they bring to it. (20; quoting 
“Nymphs and Reapers” 198) 
 
29. Hamlin’s argument usefully clarifies an important point: “Nymphs and 
Reapers” is not just positing colonialism as one ‘useful’ discursive 
framework among many other possible frameworks, it is arguing that The 
Tempest does remain in important respects unintelligible without the 
historical imbrication which that colonial framework clarifies.  “Dominant”, 
though, not exclusive: the Formalist word remains crucial to the argument 
(see Jakobson 1971).  (I return to this issue below in #53.) 
30. In best pluralist fashion, Hamlin does not want to displace the contextual 
ground of colonialism, he wants to supplement it with the discourse of 
Renaissance ethnography.  The immediate problem with this move, which 
Hamlin seems to recognise but not address, is the relationship between 
colonial discourse and ethnography.  He claims that ethnography is a 
“distinct contextual ground... valuable precisely because of its lack of strict 
connection to political ends” (22); though this is followed by an immediate 
admission of the very close implication of such ‘ethnographic’ writers as 
Pané, Las Casas, Motolinía, Durán, Sahagún, Barlowe, and Harriot in 
colonial projects.  Nonetheless, according to Hamlin, Renaissance 
ethnography is “primarily a descriptive rather than a manipulative or 
hegemonic discourse” (22), “legitimately ethnographic”, emblematizing “a 
genuine European curiosity about alien cultures” (22), and “a genuine 
uncertainty regarding the human status of cultural aliens” (23).  The 
emphasised words (emphasised by me) indicate some understandable 
anxiety here.  That Renaissance texts can have ethnographic content is not 
at issue (see, for example, Whitehead 1995): the problem comes with the 
work that the words ‘strict’ and ‘political’ have to do in affirming 
Renaissance ethnography’s “lack of strict connection to political ends”.  
‘Strict connection’ presumably implies the gathering of ethnographic 
information solely for the ends of a colonial administration, something that 
did undoubtedly happen in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
However, most ethnographic work – especially in the earlier colonial period 
– does not have such a ‘strict’ connection to political ends; which should be 
a far cry from implying that it has no connections at all, connections to 
which an extensive literature now testifies.  The same point can also be 
made from the other direction: the discourses of colonialism are far from 
monolithic themselves and just as capable “of registering curiosity, 
ambivalence, confusion, and even self-condemnation in representing and 
attempting to understand the cultural other” (22).  Hamlin’s founding 
distinction between colonial discourse and Renaissance ethnography falls at 
the first hurdle. 
31. Interestingly, the crux of Hamlin’s account of the play is the same as 
Vickers’ – Prospero’s first parenthetic reference to Caliban (1.2.281-84).  
Their arguments are significantly different, but both wrong.  For Vickers, 
Caliban is put on the stage by Shakespeare as a creature who is half-animal, 
half-man, a dramatic exploration of the problem of what constitutes a 
human being.  The lines which Vickers misreads he takes as an authorial 
statement of Caliban’s status (no nonsense here about distinctions between 
Prospero and the author).  Hamlin reads the lines as revealing Prospero’s 
own deep confusion about Caliban’s status, which allows him to argue that 
the play moves toward an affirmation of Caliban’s humanity, an affirmation 
Prospero is allowed to share.  The Tempest can be then read as a 
commentary on the pervasive motif of uncertainty about the human status of 
cultural aliens which is found within Renaissance ethnography; and that 
ethnography, elucidated by Hamlin, presented as providing an important 
context for reading the play.  Hamlin’s commentary on Prospero’s sentence 
runs as follows: 
Although Peter Hulme cites these lines as proof of Prospero’s 
“grudging admittance of Caliban’s humanity” and rails against 
those who seize upon the last six words as “evidence of Caliban’s 
lack of human shape.” I think rather that a sense of uncertainty is 
exquisitely balanced here, that “litter,” “whelp,” “hag-born” and 
the parenthetical exception play off against “son” and the main 
clause in such a way as to reveal Prospero’s own deep confusion 
about Caliban’s status. (23; quoting “Prospero and Caliban”, 114) 
 
32. This is subtler than Vickers’ argument because it depends on some 
psychological analysis (Prospero’s own “confusion”) and some dramatic 
development (the play’s eventual affirmation of Caliban’s human status).  
However, the lines won’t bear the reading Hamlin wants to make of them.  
For a start, and to be literal, there is no ‘exquisite balance’ in the sentence: 
there is a statement which includes a single exception.  Only by misreading 
could this sentence be taken as implying that Prospero thinks that Caliban is 
not human, or that the latter’s ‘humanity’ and ‘inhumanity’ are exquisitely 
balanced: the two negatives, “not” and “save”, give Caliban, for Prospero, 
“a human shape”.  Hamlin’s argument is not even consistent within its own 
terms, since he wants three of the parenthetical terms (“litter”, “whelp” and 
“hag-born”) to balance the main clause and the word “son”, which he 
thereby tellingly admits is a humanising term positively applied to Caliban, 
but unaccountably to be found inside the same parenthesis which supplies 
the supposedly dehumanising terms.  None of this is meant to imply that 
Prospero’s words are not open to all kinds of analysis.  Mine, for what it 
was worth, suggested that – as with European experience of American 
Indians – there was no doubt that Caliban was a human being: the virulence 
of the language that Prospero uses is the mark of the reluctance with which 
he accepts that identification; but accept it he does.  The language of 
bestiality only gains its power when the reference is to human subjects. 
33. In Hamlin’s own sentence “balanced” gains its rhetorical force through the 
contrast with “rails”, so it’s worth quoting the sentences from which his 
quoted phrases come: 
The otherwise inevitable concession of Miranda to Caliban is 
therefore contested discursively: Caliban is ‘got by the devil 
himself’ (I.ii.321). ‘a born devil, on whose nature / Nurture can 
never stick’ (IV.i.188-9), strenuously distanced from the social 
world into the satanic and the bestial, despite the grudging 
admittance of Caliban’s humanity in that eminently misreadable 
double negative: [quotes I.ii.281-4].  A statement whose last six 
words are still quoted on their own as ‘evidence’ of Caliban’s lack 
of human shape.  (“Prospero and Caliban” 114) 
 
To rail = to utter abusive language (OED).  I know we English are 
supposedly subtle in our use of language, but I reread those sentences with 
little comprehension as to how they could be seen as “railing” against 
anybody. 
34. In this context – and since tone is often an issue in these exchanges – let me 
throw in Russ McDonald’s complaint that recent readers of the play have 
become “increasingly single-minded and reductive, often adopting a 
censorious and shrill tone”, and that such readings have now “tyrannized 
conferences and journals with a new orthodoxy as one-sided as that which it 
has sought to replace” (17).  The British Cultural Materialists are described 
as more “virulent” than their U.S. cousins, a word the OED defines as 
“violently bitter, spiteful, or malignant; full of acrimony or enmity”.  
McDonald sees his aim as “the reconciliation of text and context, the 
aesthetic and the political” (15).  We should obviously be grateful that he 
didn't set out to be antagonistic. 
* 
35. Meredith Anne Skura’s “Discourse and the Individual: The Case of 
Colonialism in The Tempest” (1989) has rapidly become the standard 
reference point for those seeking to acknowledge something of the 
revisionary arguments, yet contain them in a higher synthesis through 
combining their insights with the best of the traditional criticism.  Such an 
approach offers itself as scholarly and judicious, broad-minded and tolerant.  
Most of the time it just misses the point. 
36. Skura’s article is indeed scholarly and well-researched.  She is able to 
contextualise postcolonial (revisionist) criticism and show its differences 
from earlier ‘historical’ and ‘American’ readings, differences which are in 
part a matter of emphasis: “Revisionists claim that the New World material 
is not just present but is right at the centre of the play, and that it demands 
far more attention than critics have been willing to grant it” (44).  That 
attention, Skura rightly suggests, has tended to be given to the power 
relations of colonial practices, in marked distinction from the ‘Americanist’ 
emphases of earlier critics: “The revisionists look not at the New World 
material in the play but to the play’s effect on power relations in the New 
World” (44).  However, her formulation soon becomes problematical: 
If Caliban is the center of the play, it is not because of his role in 
the play’s self-contained structure, and not even because of what 
he reveals about man’s timeless tendency to demonize “strangers,” 
but because Europeans were at that time exploiting the real 
Calibans of the world, and The Tempest was part of the process. 
(44-5) 
 
37. Well, yes but...  “Part of the process” in the sense that the postcolonial 
reading certainly rejects the traditional removal of the play from anything so 
political as a historical context which includes the establishment of colonial 
relationships.  But the phrase “part of the process” flattens the difficult 
question of relationship which “Nymphs and Reapers” marks with the 
usefully portentous word “imbrication”; which may fall short of specifying 
a relationship, but at least suggests more complexity than the dully 
subordinate “part of”. 
 
38. “Revisionists argue,” Skura continues: 
that when the English talked about these New World inhabitants, 
they did not just innocently apply stereotypes or project their own 
fears: they did so to a particular effect, whether wittingly or 
unwittingly.  The various distortions were discursive strategies that 
served the political purpose of making the New World fit into a 
schema justifying colonialism.  Revisionists therefore emphasize 
the discursive strategies that the play shares with all colonial 
discourse, and the ways in which The Tempest itself not only 
displays prejudice but fosters and even “enacts” colonialism by 
mystifying or justifying Prospero’s power over Caliban. (45) 
 
The last sentence offers another good illustration of the mystificatory power 
of paraphrase.  All of the statements in that sentence could probably match 
some pronouncement from within the revisionary corpus – although if 
“enacts” is a quotation, it goes unreferenced.  Yet the grain of the sentence 
works towards a further flattening of the very relationship which 
revisionists are trying to explore.  “Not only displays prejudice but” 
introduces a language of morality which most postcolonial criticism has 
been scrupulous in avoiding; with the “not only... but” construction 
suggesting that The Tempest has been judged and found guilty of even more 
serious crimes than the display of prejudice.  It’s not clear what ‘fostering 
colonialism’ might mean, but it can’t be a good thing.  ‘Enact’ also has a 
quasi-legalistic ring to it, as if a play could somehow put colonialism into 
action.  If all this is intended to refer to “Nymphs and Reapers”’s brief 
discussion of what happens when the distinctive moves and figures of 
colonialist discourse are ‘staged’ (204), then the paraphrase is inadequate 
(but in the absence of any reference it’s not easy to decide just what is 
actually being paraphrased). 
39. The second shift in revisionary criticism noted by Skura is what she calls 
the “less explicit but extremely important move away from the 
psychological interpretation that had previously seemed appropriate for the 
play” (45).  In this case it all depends on what you understand by 
‘psychological interpretation’.  It does not seem clear to me that 
psychological approaches to the play, however defined, have ever been that 
important in the critical tradition – but let that pass for the moment.  The 
supposed move away from psychological criticism is illustrated by a 
quotation which suggests that attention to the play’s moment of production 
shouldn’t be “hamstrung by specious speculations concerning 
‘Shakespeare’s mind’” (45, quoting “Prospero and Caliban” 93).  Now if 
speculations concerning Shakespeare’s mind provide us with Skura’s 
definition of psychological criticism, then we can perhaps assent to her 
claim of its earlier importance.  I was merely affirming an equally ancient 
argument, though one often honoured in the breech, which suggests the 
circularity of producing a psychology for Shakespeare from a reading of his 
plays, a psychology which is then deployed as a tool for interpreting the 
plays.  But this is a long way from suggesting that all forms of 
psychological criticism are rejected by revisionists.  As Skura herself notes, 
Jameson’s metaphor of the political unconscious, with its roots in 
Althusser’s reading of Lacan, lies behind much revisionary work (46).  
Octave Mannoni’s brief but essential remarks about the play in his 1950 
Psychologie de la colonisation (1990) – one of the founding gestures of 
postcolonial criticism of The Tempest – are imbued with his wide if eclectic 
reading in psychoanalytic theory, as are George Lamming’s (1960).  And, 
following Mannoni’s lead, revisionary analysis of Prospero has drawn 
deeply on a psychological vocabulary in trying to delineate his character.  
To identify psychological criticism with hypotheses about the mind and 
intentions of the author is an unjustifiable narrowing of its potential 
purchase. 
40. The last move of Skura’s introductory section is fully indicative of the 
overall rhetorical strategy I’m analysing here.  She begins by praising the 
“salutary” impulse of postcolonial criticism in correcting earlier blindness 
to questions of history and ideology, and she singles out studies of the 
play’s reproduction, where it has been drafted into the service of colonialist 
politics.  However, rather like Ariel with the disappearing banquet, what is 
profferred with one hand is immediately taken away with the the other: 
But here, as critics have been suggesting about new historicism in 
general, it is now in danger of fostering blindness of its own.  
Granted that something was wrong with a commentary that 
focused on The Tempest as a self-contained project of a self-
contained individual and that ignored the political situation in 
1611.  But something seems wrong now also...  The recent 
criticism not only flattens the text into the mold of colonialist 
discourse and eliminates what is characteristically 
“Shakespearean” in order to foreground what is “colonialist,” but it 
is also – paradoxically – in danger of taking the play further from 
the particular historical situation in England in 1611 even as it 
brings it closer to what we mean by “colonialism” today. (46-7) 
 
41. Having used paraphrase to simplify the key relationship which the 
revisionists are trying to explore, Skura then judges their work through the 
prism of her own misrepresentation and unsurprisingly finds that it 
“flattens” the text.  But it is the other two charges which reveal the real drift 
of her critique.  The ‘colonialist’ is foregrounded by eliminating the 
“characteristically ‘Shakespearean’”: an extraordinary opposition.  And the 
attempt to produce a historical form of criticism is seen as merely political 
(“what we mean by ‘colonialism’ today”) rather than properly historical 
(“the particular situation in England in 1611”).  What is needed to 
counteract these weaknesses – she then argues – is some connection 
between recent cultural criticism “and the traditional insights about the text, 
its immediate sources, its individual author – and his individual 
psychology” (47).  Since the revisionists have paid extensive attention to 
The Tempest’s immediate sources, this amounts to stating that we need to 
pay more attention to Shakespeare’s psychology.  The problem is that 
attempting to connect the insights of cultural criticism to speculations about 
Shakespeare’s psychology is a bit like arranging a match between a cricket 
team and a baseball team – they don’t even share a language. 
42. In order to prise The Tempest away from the dead hand of colonial 
discourse, Skura goes to work on the character of Caliban, to which the 
revisionists have paid a good deal of attention.  The resemblances between 
Caliban and Native Americans are not denied; rather the revisionists are 
said to assume that these similarities matter, whereas the differences do not 
(49): “Thus Caliban is taken to ‘be’ a Native American despite the fact that 
a multitude of details differentiate Caliban from the Indian as he appeared in 
the travelers’ reports from the New World” (48).  That “be” is worryingly 
similar to the earlier “enact”: it suggests a quotation, and yet the footnote 
reference, which refers to “Hurricanes”, doesn’t lead to any such quotation.  
It’s obviously useful to have a revisionist take Caliban to “be” a Native 
American, but none appears to have been rash enough to make the 
identification that Skura has little difficulty refuting.
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43. However little of this one might gather from Skura’s essay, criticism on 
Caliban has worked hard at complicating the character.  She chooses to refer 
at this stage almost exclusively to my early essay “Hurricanes” (1981): 
Hulme, while noting Caliban’s “anomalous nature,” sees the 
anomaly as yet another colonialist strategy: “In ideological terms 
[Caliban is] a compromise formation and one achieved, like all 
such formations, only at the expense of distortion elsewhere”...  
This begs the question: Caliban can only be a “distortion” if he is 
intended to represent someone. (48, quoting “Hurricanes” 71, 72) 
 
44. My jejeune attempts at producing a Machereyan analysis of The Tempest’s 
production of the character of Caliban obviously fell pretty flat, at least for 
this reader.  Once again, arguments flow more smoothly if quoted words are 
made out to say something other than their actual import.  “[A]t the expense 
of distortion elsewhere” does not suggest that Caliban “is” a distortion, and 
so there is no imputed intention that he represent someone.  Any such 
imputation would imply a distinctly impoverished notion of the relationship 
between the literary text and the historical world.  Indeed, to call Caliban a 
“compromise formation” was precisely an attempt to think otherwise about 
the question of representation.  The arguments that he is an American 
Indian, or is a medieval wild man failed to register (I suggested) that his 
‘monstrosity’ consisted of his excess of characteristics, many of them 
registered by those who perceive him and comment on him.
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  The phrase 
“compromise formation” suggests two discourses, which are identified as 
‘Mediterranean’ and ‘Atlantic’, each with their respective vocabularies.  
One might have thought that such a formulation gave some weight to the 
non-Native American features of Caliban, but the heavy hand of Skura’s 
paraphrase rescues the day by seeing in the phrase ‘anomalous nature’ “yet 
another colonialist strategy”.  The word ‘strategy’ appears nowhere in my 
discussion of the play, and its suggestion of conscious control runs counter 
to the language of textual production (drawing on Macherey’s reading of 
Freud) employed throughout that piece. 
45. The last part of Skura’s essay focusses on the interrupted masque, the scene 
which she rightly identifies as key to many postcolonial arguments.  What’s 
odd about Skura’s general approach here is that her psychological analysis 
is often very close to, sometimes identical with, postcolonial positions, even 
as she offers it as an alternative.  For example: 
Caliban’s function as a walking screen for projection may help 
explain why Caliban’s sin does not consist in cannibalism, to 
which one asssumes, Prospero was never tempted, but rather in 
Prospero’s own repressed fantasies of omnipotence and lust.  Of 
course Prospero is also angry that Caliban is now threatening both 
his authority on the island and his justification of that authority; 
but the extraordinary intensity of Prospero’s rage suggests a 
conjunction of psychological as well as political passion. (60-61) 
 
46. There is nothing wrong with this as an analysis of Prospero’s repressed 
fantasies except for the weird assumption that the political needs to be an 
“also” to the psychological, leading to a “conjunction” of two separate 
dimensions.  The very foundation of postcolonial readings of the play – in 
Mannoni and Lamming – has been the identity of the political and 
psychological dimensions. 
47. Since I’ve found a great deal to criticise in other people’s paraphrases of my 
arguments, let me emphasise that there is much of value in Skura’s essay.  
She goes through the ‘New World’ evidence with great thoroughness, and 
adds significantly to the psychological analysis of the character of Prospero.  
However, her strategy of combining the postcolonial with the traditional 
readings is vitiated by deep misunderstandings of the kinds of complexities 
to which that postcolonial criticism has drawn attention, and by misreadings 
of the passages to which she refers, even if these misreadings are rarely as 
egregious as those discussed earlier. 
* 
48. For better or worse, what I’ve been discussing as the postcolonial reading of 
The Tempest is now the ‘orthodox’ approach (Dawson 1988: 68).  The 
achievement in establishing that new orthodoxy should not be 
underestimated.  Since it has hardly been welcomed by elements of the 
Shakespearean establishment, it must obviously owe its position to the force 
of its arguments. 
49. The postcolonial reading of The Tempest separates the ‘colonial’ reading of 
the play from a mere identification of ‘American’ or ‘New World’ elements: 
these have often been identified over the years, but there is nothing 
necessarily revisionist in the readings of the plays associated with them (see 
Vaughan 1998).  Although I’ve tended to approach The Tempest from my 
prior interest in the Caribbean, the suggestion in “Hurricanes in the 
Caribbees” was that the play combined Atlantic and Mediterranean 
discourses and that Caliban was the key link connecting them.  Over the last 
ten years, the most interesting postcolonial readings have been those which 
have illuminated The Tempest’s ‘Mediterranean’ discourse, enriching our 
sense of the play’s contemporary contexts and deepening our understanding 
of the complexities of sixteenth-century colonial and cross-cultural 
relationships.
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50. Looking back at what is now nearly twenty years of responses to 
postcolonial readings, two fundamental misunderstandings still puzzle me.  
Although those readings have been deeply interested in questions of power 
and violence and land (and have therefore been ‘political’), they have also – 
at least the ones I’ve been responsible for – been deeply formalist in their 
approach to the play, basing themselves, for example, on arguments about 
the relationship of the main plot to the sub-plot or on what might constitute 
the articulatory principle of different elements of the play’s language.  The 
political and the formalist seem to me inextricable, no doubt because they 
are found together in the three works of theory that were my formative 
influences: Pierre Macherey’s A Theory of Literary Production, Louis 
Althusser’s Reading Capital, and P.N. Medvedev’s The Formal Method in 
Literary Scholarship.  Why then does anti-postcolonial criticism so often 
assume, in Russ McDonald’s words, that postcolonial criticism addresses 
the play “solely in terms of social and political contexts” to the detriment of 
concern with textual details and formal properties” (1991: 15)? 
51. The other aspect of anti-postcolonial criticism that puzzles me is its felt 
need to ‘defend’ Shakespeare from what it sees as ‘attack’ by his ‘enemies’.  
There are genuine and important differences in emphasis concerning the 
degree of authorial consciousness which might be identified in The 
Tempest.  David Norbrook correctly points out that most revisionist 
criticism sees the contradictions and complexities of the play – ignored by 
traditional readings – as unconscious effects of discourse, present before 
and despite the authorial closure with its reassertion of the social order 
(1992: 22).  In contrast, Norbrook has a knowledgeable Shakespeare, 
perfectly capable of a dramatic reflection on the complexities of the new 
colonial relationship between old world and new (39).  But none of the 
postcolonial readings I’ve been discussing show the least interest in 
‘attacking’ Shakespeare: nothing in their language suggests such an 
intention, unless the interest in bringing Shakespearean texts into dialogue 
with other discourses is taken as tantamount to ‘attack’.  As Sinfield notes: 
“It is as if any attempt to bring Shakespeare into contact with a wider 
political reality is so threatening that it must be positioned instantly as both 
crass and malign” (2001: 1).  Postcolonial criticism is simply uninterested in 
either attacking or celebrating Shakespeare: its aim is to understand the 
relationship between The Tempest and the incipient discourses of 
colonialism. 
* 
52. The previous 51 paragraphs will have suggested that I’m less relaxed than 
Alan Sinfield about misquotation, misreading, and misleading paraphrase.  
Richard Levin is right to point out that all quotation is by definition 
selective, but he himself accepts that there are standards in this matter and 
he has the grace to admit that he has not always maintained the highest.  
‘Standards’ and ‘scholarship’ tend to be words that are associated with the 
more traditional (newly non-orthodox) readings of the plays, with the self-
appointed ‘defenders’ of Shakespeare, and with those who take a ‘balanced’ 
view of disagreements they see as unfortunately political.  My survey of the 
literature – admittedly self-centred – would suggest that those standards are 
rather often not adhered to.  In fact, when it comes to responses to the 
postcolonial criticism on The Tempest over the last twenty years, the record 
seems to me pretty lamentable. 
53. However, in overall terms, I have a less pessimistic view of the possibiliites 
for intellectual debate than either Levin or Sinfield, which is why, in this 
essay, I’ve been trying to edge the grounds of the debate in a slightly 
different direction.  I’ll end by drawing out these larger implications.  There 
are three stages to the argument.  First, that there is more heterogeneity that 
often recognised within what tend to be seen as entrenched positions (and 
Richard Levin has probably done more than anyone else to attempt to 
establish the singularity of the ‘new left’ position).  However, second, that 
the recognition of heterogeneity is not the same as the acceptance of 
pluralism.  Here Levin is quite right to point out that any fully-fledged 
relativism will struggle to justify its own readings on any other grounds than 
as a form of voluntarism (1992: 53).  So, for example, the postcolonial 
claim that the discourse of colonialism is the “articulatory principle of The 
Tempest’s diversity” is genuinely incompatible with many other claims 
about the play.  It contests other readings.  But, finally, the refusal of 
pluralism, the refusal to say that all approaches are equal and all opinions 
valid, does not in itself imply that the intellectual debate is over and that 
truth has been revealed.  We make the best arguments we can, but the 
available knowledge changes, new readings emerge. We may not in practice 
succeed in persuading our intellectual opponents of their errors, and we may 
have firm views about why they so obstinately refuse to see the truths that 
are so apparent to us, but we need to believe that the grounds for such 
persuasion do exist.  However, for the discussions to be fruitful we must 
read and quote and paraphrase the words of others with due care and, if we 
don’t, we deserve to have our readings of literary texts taken with less 
seriousness. 
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